A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS TO SUSPEND ELECTED OFFICIALS IN RIVERS STATE IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY: REVISITING PLATEAU STATE OF NIGERIA& ANOR V ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ANORs

Abstract

This paper interrogates the constitutionality of the President’s power to suspend a democratically elected Governor during a state of emergency, particularly in light of President Tinubu’s controversial action in Rivers State on 18 March 2025. The President had suspended Governor Fubara, his deputy, and members of the House of Assembly, appointing a sole administrator to govern the state for six months. This intervention is reminiscent of a similar occurrence in 2004 when former President Olusegun Obasanjo removed Governor Dariye of Plateau State and appointed an interim administrator following a state of emergency. The legal dispute that arose from that incident culminated in Plateau State of Nigeria & Anor v Attorney-General of the Federation & Anor, in which the plaintiffs sought to know, among other things, the constitutionality of suspending a sitting Governor and replacing him with an administrator. However, the Supreme Court struck out the suit on procedural grounds, leaving a significant knowledge gap on the legality of a President displacing an elected state executive and imposing administrators during a state of emergency. Accordingly, this study aims to fill this gap by calling in aid the relevant constitutional provisions—particularly Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended)—juxtaposed with expert opinions and related case laws. Through doctrinal legal analysis, the paper evaluates whether the procedures and grounds for declaring a state of emergency were observed in Rivers State and whether the President’s actions align with Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The findings reveal that the 1999 Constitution (as amended) does not expressly empower the President to suspend elected state officials or appoint administrators during emergencies, and that such actions undermine the principles of federalism and democratic accountability. The paper concludes that the procedural and substantive safeguards in Section 305 are not mere formalities but essential checks on executive power.